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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jeffrey Ball appeals from his conviction and sentence entered upon his 
guilty plea to rape. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinqs 
Ball recorded his son and the son's 16-year-old girlfriend in a sexually 
compromised position. (61912008 PSE, p. 5; R., vol. I, pp. 23-27.) He used this 
incident and other threats to blackmail and coerce the girlfriend into having sex 
with him on multiple occasions. (61912008 PSE, p. 5; R., vol. I, pp. 23-27.) He 
videotaped some of the rapes. (61912008 PSE, p. 5; R., vol. I, pp. 23-27.) 
The state charged Ball with one count of rape. (R., vol. II, pp. 216-17.) 
The state charged alternate theories of rape, both because of the victim's age 
and because of force and violence. (Id.) Ball entered into a plea agreement. 
(R., vol. 11, pp. 218-22.) The terms of the plea agreement included dismissal of a 
firearms charge in another case (4114108 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 9-12); that the sentence 
imposed by the court would be for ten years, leaving to the court's discretion how 
much of that ten years to make determinate (4114108 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 13-18); that the 
ten-year sentence would be binding on the court under I.C.R. I l(f)(l)(C) (4114108 
Tr., p. 5, Ls. 13-15); that Ball would undergo a psychosexual evaluation and 
polygraph examination (4114108 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 19-21); that Ball would not be 
charged based on matters arising from the psychosexual examination and 
polygraph (4114108 Tr., p. 5, L. 19 - p. 6, L. 3); and that the state would not file 
additional charges arising from evidence found pursuant to the search warrant 
associated with this case (4114108 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 3-14). After being apprised of the 
terms of the agreement, the district court took Ball's guilty plea. (4114108 Tr., p. 
10, L. 1 - p. 16, L. 25). 
At sentencing the district court announced that, after review of the 
sentencing materials, it would not be bound to the sentencing recommendation of 
ten years and gave Ball the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. (7/10/08 Tr., 
p. 20, Ls. 12-24.) After a recess, Ball agreed to go forward with the sentencing. 
(7110108 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 1-20.) The judge ultimately imposed a sentence of 20 
years with seven years fixed. (7110108 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 15-17; R., vol. II, pp. 263- 
67.) Ball filed a notice of appeal timely from the entry of judgment. (R., vol. II, 
pp. 271-72.) 
ISSUES 
Ball states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to be 
bound by the Rule 11 plea agreement at sentencing, after it had the 
benefit of the psychosexual and polygraph examinations? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced 
Mr. Ball to twenty years, with seven fixed, following his guilty plea to 
rape? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. The district court concluded that its ultimate sentence was not going to be 
within the range agreed to by the parties in the binding Rule 11 agreement. It 
gave Ball the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, but Ball elected not to 
withdraw his plea. The district court therefore fully complied with its duties under 
Rule 11. Has Ball failed to show that the district court erred? 
2. Has Ball failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it 
sentenced him to 20 years with seven fixed for rape? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Ball Has Failed To Show That The District Court Failed To Comply With I.C.R. 11 
A. Introduction 
The district court informed Ball that it would not be following the parties' 
sentencing recommendations and gave Ball the opportunity to withdraw his guilty 
plea as required by I.C.R. 11(f)(4). (7/10/08 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 12-24.) Ball argues on 
appeal that because he had submitted to the PSE and the polygraph the court 
was required to sentence him in the range agreed to by the parties because 
withdrawal of the plea was no longer a "sufficient remedy." (Appellant's brief, pp. 
4-7, 10.) This argument fails for two reasons. First, it was not preserved by an 
objection below. Second, it is clear on the record that the district court complied 
with the requirements of Rule 11. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation of an ldaho Criminal Rule presents a question of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Weber, 140 ldaho 
89, 91-92, 90 P.3d 314, 316-17 (2004) (citing State v. Larios, 129 ldaho 631, 
633, 931 P.2d 625, 627 (1997); State v. Dallas, 126 ldaho 273, 274, 882 P.2d 
440,441 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
C. Ball Did Not Preserve This Issue For Appellate Review With A Timely 
Obiection In The District Court 
It is well settled that issues not raised before the trial court will not be 
considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Martin, 119 ldaho 577, 579, 808 
P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991). See also State v. Mauro, 121 ldaho 178, 181, 824 P.2d 
109, 112 (1991); State v. Smith, 130 ldaho 450,454,942 P.2d 574,578 (Ct. App. 
1997). Because Ball did not assert to the district court that it had lost all 
discretion to reject the sentencing recommendations, and does not on appeal 
claim fundamental error, he has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. 
D. Because The District Court Comolied With I.C.R. I I BV Allowinq Ball The 
Op~ortunitv To Withdraw His Guilty Plea. Ball Has Failed To Show Error 
Rule 11 of the ldaho Criminal Rules sets forth the applicable plea 
agreement procedures. I . .  . I f ) .  A plea agreement may include an 
agreement for a specific sentence. I.C.R. Il(f)(l)(C). If the agreement is for a 
specific sentence, tine court may defer its acceptance of the agreement until 
"there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report." I.A.R. 
11(f)(2). If the court rejects the plea agreement, it must give the defendant the 
opportunity to withdraw the plea. 1,C.R. I I (f)(4). 
The record shows that the district court followed the requirements of Rule 
11. It specifically informed Ball at the time of the plea itself that it would inform 
Ball at the time of sentencing if it accepted the plea agreement and give him the 
opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea if it did not. (4114108 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 8-17.) 
Ball stated that he understood this. (4114108 Tr., p. 13, L. 18.) The district court 
also explained to Ball that if it accepted the plea at the time of sentencing Ball 
would have no right to withdraw his plea. (4114108 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 19-23.) 
At the time of sentencing the district court informed Ball that it was not 
going to accept the parties' sentencing recommendation and gave him the 
opportunity to withdraw his plea. (7/10/08 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 12-24.) Ball elected to 
proceed with sentencing. (7/10108 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 1-20.) The record establishes 
that the district court fully and completely complied with the mandates of Rule 11. 
Ball does not contend that the district court failed to follow the 
requirements of Rule 11. He instead argues that the court "abused its discretion 
by refusing to be bound by the Rule 11 plea agreement at sentencing" because 
"the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea was not a sufficient remedy" and 
because Rule 11 prohibited the district court from considering any information 
other than the PSI before accepting or rejecting the strictures of the sentencing 
recommendation in the plea agreement. (Appellant's brief, p. 4.) Ball's argument 
is without merit. 
On appeal, Ball cites only three legal authorities, Schoaer v. State, - 
l d a h o ,  226 P.3d 1269 (2010); State v. Hedaer, 115 ldaho 598, 600-601, 768 
P.2d 1331, 1333-34 (1989); and I.C.R. 11. (Appellant's brief, pp. 4-7.) None of 
these authorities, however, in any way supports Ball's argument. 
In Schoqer the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting a 
proffered guilty plea. Schoaer, ldaho at -, 226 P.3d at 1275-76. The only 
issue addressed and decided in Schoaer was a district court's discretion to reject 
a proffered guilty plea. This case in no way addressed the question of when a 
court would be bound to follow a sentencing recommendation. 
In Hedger the ldaho Supreme Court addressed a claim of error related to 
a challenge for cause to a potential juror. Hedger, 7 15 ldaho at 600, 768 P.2d at 
1333. This case is not relevant to the argument Ball asserts. 
Finally, Rule 11 does not provide a "remedy," and Ball does not state why 
he believes it does; nor does he state what wrong the rule is supposed to provide 
a remedy for. Rather, the rule is very clear: under certain types of plea 
agreements the court must either accept the parties' sentencing recommendation 
or it must allow the defendant to withdraw his plea. That Ball wishes there was a 
third option -- that the court was completely bound to accept the recommendation 
-- does not alter the rule; the plain language of the rule does not bend to his 
desires. The district court clearly did what the rule requires. Once it had 
concluded that it would not give a sentence within the limits set in the plea 
agreement, it gave Ball the opportunity to withdraw his plea.' 
Ball's argument that Rule 11 prohibited the district court from considering 
the PSE or polygraph before deciding whether to accept the parties' sentencing 
recommendations is also without merit. The PSI is mentioned in the  ort ti on of 
' Ball's underlying premise - that if he withdrew his plea he would be vulnerable 
to prosecution for matters revealed in the PSE or polygraph - is also highly 
questionable. The most likely reading of the agreement is that it effectively 
granted limited immunity for statements Ball made during the psychosexuai and 
polygraph examinations such that the state was barred from using the 
information he disclosed in any criminal prosecution other than the sentencing in 
this case. (4114108 Tr., p. 5, L. 19 - p. 6, L. 3.) Thus, the state's obligation to not 
prosecute would be triggered by the full and voluntary participation in the 
evaluations, not the ultimate acceptance of the sentencing recommendations. 
the rule providing that the sentencing court may defer acceptance of the 
agreement. I.C.R. I I (f)(Z) (the court may "defer its decision as to acceptance or 
rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report"). 
The relevant language applicable here, however, is in a different subsection of 
the rule. "If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court shall, on the record, 
inform the parties of this fact, advise the defendant personally in open court ... 
that the court is not bound by the plea agreement [and] afford the defendant the 
opportunity to then withdraw the defendant's plea ...." I .  I l ( ( 4 ) .  Under the 
plain language of the rule the court could initially accept the plea agreement, but 
then, after considering everything at sentencing, conclude that the agreed-upon 
sentence is not appropriate, reject the agreement, and give the defendant the 
opportunity to withdraw his plea. There is nothing in the language of the rule 
supporting Ball's argument that the district court is restricted to deciding the 
sentence on the PSI alone. 
The district court followed Rule 11 when it gave Ball the opportunity to 
withdraw his guilty plea after it had decided that it would not be bound by the 
parties' sentencing recommendation. This is all that Rule 11 requires. Ruling 
that a district court is bound to give a sentence it deems inappropriate would do 
violence both to the language of the rule and the public policy underlying it. Ball 
has failed to show error by the district court. 
II. 
Ball Has Failed To Show That His Sentence Is Excessive 
A. Introduction 
The judge imposed a sentence of 20 years with seven years fixed upon 
Ball's conviction for rape. (7/10/08 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 15-17; R., vol. II, pp. 263-67.) 
Ball contends the court abused its discretion because he claimed acceptance of 
responsibility and had the support of his family. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9.) 
While acceptance of responsibility is laudable, especially if sincere, and the 
support of family is certainly worthy of consideration, Ball has failed to show that, 
when all of the facts are considered, the district court's sentence is 
unreasonable. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 ldaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. 
C. Ball Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Sentencinq Discretion 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant 
must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence is 
excessive. State v. Farwell, 144 ldaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To 
establish that his sentence is excessive, Ball must demonstrate that reasonable 
minds could not conclude the sentence is appropriate to accomplish the 
sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. 
Farwell, 144 ldaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. In determining whether the appellant 
met his burden, the court considers the entire sentence but, because the 
decision to release him on parole is exclusively the province of the executive 
branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the period of actual 
incarceration. State v. Oliver, 144 ldaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 
The district court stated that the facts of the crime, unmentioned in Ball's 
argument (B generally Appellant's brief, pp. 7-Q), were "a big factor in the 
sentence" it ultimately ordered (7/10/08 Tr., p. 32, Ls. 1-2). The court stated 
those facts as follows: 
We have a situation where we have a defendant in his 40's - he's 
age 43 right now - who had an ongoing sexual relationship with the 
victim, who was sixteen years old. This was not an isolated event. 
It was an ongoing situation. And of greatest concern, however, is 
that, based on what I have seen in the material that's been supplied 
to me, is that it was not a consensual relationship. It was 
perpetrated by the defendant through threats to the victim, in effect 
blackmailing the victim through threats to - to her to perpetuate the 
ongoing relationship. 
(7/10/08 Tr., p. 32, Ls. 2-13.) This abuse, the court concluded, had a great effect 
on the victim and her family, which would probably last the rest of her life. 
(7/10/08 Tr., p. 32, Ls. 14-23.) The court also noted that in his statement Ball 
neglected to mention the effect his conduct had had on the victim and her family. 
(7/10/08 Tr., p. 33, Ls. 7-12.) 
Contrary to Ball's arguments, the court specifically considered Ball's family 
support. (7/10/08 Tr., p. 32, L. 24 - p. 33, L. 7.) This was, the court concluded, a 
somewhat mixed positive, however, because Ball had, through his actions, also 
greatly harmed his family. (Id.) 
The district court also, contrary to Ball's argument, specifically considered 
Ball's statements of remorse. (7/10/08 Tr., p. 33, Ls. 13-19.) The court 
specifically stated that based at least in part on Ball's willingness to accept 
responsibility he had the ability to be rehabilitated. (7/10/08 Tr., p. 33, L. 13 - p. 
34, L. 8.) The court felt that Ball's rehabilitation potential was outweighed, 
however, by the facts of the crime when it considered all the goals of sentencing. 
(7/10/08 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 8-14.) 
The district court specifically considered the factors Ball relies on in his 
appellate argument. The court found those factors to be outweighed by other 
factors, especially the facts of the crime itself. Ball merely ignores the other 
factors found significant by the district court. Because Ball has failed to show 
that the district court abused its discretion in balancing the applicable factors 
under the proper legal standard, he has failed to show an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Ball's judgment of 
conviction. 
DATED this 4th day of May 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 4th day of May 2010, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
HEATHER M. CARLSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
